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Manager decision-making 
The manager is operating under the constraint of a fixed monitoring budget B, with their sole 
real-time decision being the allocation of this budget between two types of monitoring (of 
compliance with the rules and of the biological population). They make this decision based 
upon their understanding of the system structure and dynamics. This understanding is 
inherent in their a priori choice of assessment method (e.g. whether they consider the effects 
of harvester decisions in their assessment of the likely effects of their own allocation 
decisions).  
 
Performance against management objectives is assessed using a suite of metrics. A wide 
range of metrics can be employed depending on the objectives, reflecting monetary outcomes 
(such as revenues to harvesters, or to managers from penalties), social outcomes (based on 
the mean and distribution of utility) and biological outcomes (such as the stability and mean 
size of the harvested stocks).  
 
Equations for the MSE sub-models 
 
Operating model (Resource) 
The model of the stock dynamics follows a simple discrete logistic functional form, where Nt 
is population size at time t, K is the carrying capacity, r is the intrinsic rate of increase, Ht is 
the harvest mortality (from the harvester model), and process error is introduced very 
crudely, via a Normally distributed random variable, where σN is the standard deviation of the 
population size N and zN,t is drawn from a standardised Normal distribution of mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1.  
 
௧ܰାଵ = ቂݖே,௧ߪே + ୣ୶୮(௥)ே೟௄௄ା(ୣ୶୮(௥)ିଵ)ே೟ቃ − ܪ௧ (Eqn S1) 
 
Operating model (harvester) 
General 
I assume a homogeneous harvester community represented by one household, which both 
produces agricultural goods and harvests wildlife. Wildlife produce is always sold, while 
agricultural produce can either be all consumed at home or all sold. A full income 
formulation, in which both products can be consumed and sold, would be a less restrictive 
approach (18). In line with the typical situation of bushmeat hunters in Central/West Africa, I 
assume constant costs and prices, representing a competitive market with no supply and 
demand dynamics. I assume the resource is de facto open access and households do not save, 
hence the harvesters are optimising only in the current time-period. I also, less realistically, 
assume risk neutrality and perfect knowledge, except that the population size of the resource 
is perceived by harvesters with uncertainty. I include a labour constraint, which assumes 
there is no market for labour. However, for simplicity, the model does not include a shadow 
wage and consumption of leisure time. This means that the model’s behaviour is similar to 
that of a simple profit-maximising model. 
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Utility maximisation 
Utility maximisation is based on a Cobb-Douglas specification. I test two alternate 
formulations of the equation, where α is the elasticity of consumption, G is the composite 
good, and QF,t is the quantity of agricultural produce consumed. 
 
Household sells both agricultural and wildlife produce to buy a composite good: 
 
max	[ ௧ܷ = ߙ݈݊ܩ௧]  Eqn S2a 
 
Household consumes farm produce and sells wildlife produce:  
 
max	[ ௧ܷ = ߙ݈݊ܳி,௧ + (1 − ߙ)݈݊ܩ௧] Eqn S2b 
 
Note when G or QF,t  <1, utility is either undefined or negative, so utility is taken as zero. 
 
Returns to labour 
The returns to labour from farming are expressed as: 
 
ܳி,௧ = ܣܮி,௧ఉಷ    Eqn S3a 
and from harvesting: 
ܪ௧ = ݍܰ݌݁ݎܿ௧ܮு,௧ఉಹ   Eqn S3b 
 
where βF and βH are the elasticity of production for agriculture and harvesting respectively, 
LF,t and LH,t are the amount of labour invested in agriculture or harvesting, A is the area of 
land available for agriculture, assumed constant, and the amount harvested Ht is a function of 
the perceived population size of the resource, Nperct, and catchability q, where:  
 
ܰ݌݁ݎܿ௧ = ௧ܰ + ݖ௉,௧ߪ௉  Eqn S4 
 
σP is the standard deviation of the perceived population size Nperc, and zP,t is drawn from a 
standardised Normal distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Note that as the 
harvester is optimising before the fact, the (perceived) returns to harvesting are a function of 
the perceived, not the real, population size.  
 
Budget constraint 
The budget constraint if all produce is sold is: 
 
݌ீܩ௧ = 	݌ிܳி,௧ + ݌ுܪ௧ − ܿுܮு,௧ − ߜߠ௧ܲ(ܪ௧ − ܪݎݑ݈݁௧)  (Eqn S5a) 
 
where the total value of goods that can be bought for consumption, price pG x quantity Gt, 
equals the amount of goods produced (the price of agricultural produce pF  x the amount 
produced QF,t  + the price of harvested produce pH  x the amount produced Ht) minus the cost 
of production. We assume that that agricultural price is net of labour costs, while harvesting 
has its costs of labour included explicitly so we can separate them for policy exploration 
purposes. The cost of harvesting is the direct cost of labour (cH x LH,t ) + the expected cost of 
illegal harvesting.  
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The expected cost of illegal harvesting is made up of: a dummy variable δ, which is set at 0 if 
there is no illegal harvesting, 1 otherwise; θt, the probability of detection (from the 
monitoring model), P the penalty per unit of illegal harvesting, and (Ht-Hrulet) the level of 
illegal harvesting, defined as harvesting exceeding the HCR. Hence the more illegal 
harvesting the household does, the higher the expected cost.  
 
If harvested produce is sold and agricultural produce is consumed, only the harvested produce 
contributes to the budget constraint: 
 
݌ீܩ௧ = 	݌ுܪ௧ − ܿுܮு,௧ − ߜߠ௧ܲ(ܪ௧ − ܪݎݑ݈݁௧)  (Eqn S5b) 
 
Optimising labour allocation 
The household’s only decision is the allocation of labour between farming and harvesting. 
For a given labour allocation, we can derive the following expressions for Gt, the amount of 
the composite good that can be bought. 
 
If both products are sold, and we normalise the price of the composite good, pG, to 1, 
substitute the right hand side of equation S3a into equation S5a, and set LH,t to be the 
remainder of labour after allocation of a proportion of the fixed total amount of labour, Lmax, 
to agriculture, then the harvester’s perceived level of consumption at a given level of 
agricultural labour and for a given resource population size is: 
 
ܩ௧ = ݌ுݍܰ݌݁ݎܿ௧(ܮ௠௔௫ − ܮி)ఉಹ − ܿ(ܮ௠௔௫ − ܮி) + ݌ிܣܮிఉಷ − ߜߠ௧ܲ(ܪ௧ − ܪݎݑ݈݁௧) 
Eqn S6a 
 
i.e. the goods that can be purchased are the amount that is made from selling the harvested 
produce plus the amount made from selling the agricultural produce minus the expected 
penalty for illegal harvest. 
 
Similarly, if agricultural produce is consumed, I substitute equation S3b into S5b to obtain: 
 
ܩ௧ = (݌ுݍܰ݌݁ݎܿ௧ − ܿ)(ܮ௠௔௫ − ܮி)ఉಹ − ܿ(ܮ௠௔௫ − ܮி) + ߜߠ௧ܲ(ܪ௧ − ܪݎݑ݈݁௧) 
Eqn S6b 
 
In the default condition, I assume that agricultural produce is consumed (Eqns 2b-6b).  
 
Assessment model 
The setting of the harvest control rule is not the focus of the model, and so only three simple 
HCRs are tested: 
 
a) Static: a simple proportional harvest rate.  
ܪݎݑ݈݁௧ = ℎ݉ ∗ ܰ݋ܾݏ௧ିଵ Eqn S7 
 
The harvest rule Hrulet is a proportion hm of the observed population size last year Nobst-1. 
 
b) Maximise yield: Maximise harvest levels subject to a conservation threshold, without 
regard to harvester decisions. This effectively gives a harvest quota of MSY but with a 
reduction in the harvest rate if there is high stochasticity in the system. In order to set the 
appropriate harvest level, At the beginning of the simulation, the manager projects forward 
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once for a number of years using Equation S1, with the aim of capturing the equilibrium 
conditions (so observations are only taken after transients), for a range of harvest rates, but 
with just one model run. Stochasticity is confined to the population size, rather than 
observations. The harvest rate that maximises yield during the observation period (e.g. from 
year 30 to 50), while keeping the population size above the performance threshold in >90% 
of the years, is chosen. 
 
c) Maximise Utility: This harvest rate is chosen to maximise mean harvester utility over the 
observation period (after transients) for one model run (including all sources of stochasticity). 
The allocation to monitoring and the penalty for illegal harvesting are fixed at the default 
rates.  
 
Monitoring model  
I assume that there is a baseline level of provision for resource monitoring so an uncertain 
estimate of population size is always available. The total (fixed) budget B for additional 
monitoring comprises resource monitoring, BNt, plus the budget for monitoring harvesting, 
BHt: 
 
ܤ = ܤே೟ + ܤு೟ Eqn S8 
 
For the budget for law enforcement: 
ߠ௧ = (1 − ܦ)஻ಹ೟  Eqn S9 
 
θt is the probability of detection, D is the detectability of harvesters. For example, if D=0.97, 
then all the illegal harvesters escape if none of the budget is allocated to monitoring 
harvesting, while if all the budget is allocated to monitoring harvesting (BH=1), only 3% of 
the illegal harvesting is undetected: 
 
The observation error for the resource population is governed by: 
 
ܥܸ(ܰ݋ܾݏ௧) = 1 − ୣ୶୮	(௔ା௕஻ಿ೟)ଵାୣ୶୮	(௔ା௕஻ಿ೟) Eqn S10 
 
where CV(Nobst) is the coefficient of variation of the observed population size, and depends 
only on the budget allocation, not on population size. With a = 0.5 and b = 0.018, the CV is 
around 40% with no budget given to resource monitoring and around 10% with 100% of the 
budget given to resource monitoring (BN=1). This represents realistic levels for wildlife 
monitoring.  
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Allocation of monitoring effort 
I test two scenarios for the monitoring model: 
 
a) Static. The allocation is fixed and invariant. 
 
b) Informed. Allocation is model-based, and carried out at the beginning of the modelled 
time period. The manager runs the entire system model forward once, for a set number of 
years, including all stochasticity, and hence assuming perfect knowledge of the system 
functions and parameter values. However as it is only one short run, the allocation will not be 
perfectly informed. The manager loops over a range of budget allocations and chooses the 
allocation that optimises performance. The performance rule that the manager uses to choose 
the allocation is: Maximise the allocation of resources to population monitoring, subject to 
illegal harvesting exceeding the HCR by less than a threshold level. 
 
Model implementation 
An illustration of the implementation of the integrated model within a one year simulation 
run is given below. The allocation of the budget and the HCR are set in advance, while the 
household optimises its labour allocation every year.  
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The output variables are: Ht, the yield; Nt, the population size; At the proportion of illegal 
harvesting; and Ut, the utility, which are determined by the parameters and the functional 
forms outlined above, and form the basis for the performance metrics. The manager observes 
Nt rather than knowing it precisely (Nobst). 
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Table S1. The default values for the model parameters.  
 
Name Symbol Value 
Total budget ($) B 100 
Harvester detectability  D 0.03 
Carrying capacity (animals) K 500 
Standard deviation of N σN 40 
Intrinsic rate of increase r 0.2 
Starting resource population size (animals) N0 500 
Standard deviation of harvester perceived N σNperc  10 
Constant of resource monitoring curve a 0.5 
Constant of resource monitoring curve b 0.018 
Elasticity of farming production βF 0.8 
Elasticity of wildlife harvesting production βH 0.8 
Land area (hectares) A 50 
Maximum labour available Lmax 10 
Unit price of the composite good ($) pG 1 
Unit price of farming products ($) pF 1 
Unit price of wildlife products ($) pH 2 
Unit cost of wildlife harvesting ($) cH 0.2 
Catchability coefficient q 0.2 
Unit penalty for over-harvesting ($) P 1 
Elasticity of consumption of the composite good α 0.5 
Performance threshold for Nt (propn of K) N_t 0.3 
Performance threshold for Ut (propn of Umax) U_t 0.5 
Acceptable level of illegal harvesting (propn of 
Hrule) 
H_t 0.1 
Harvesting mortality (propn of N – static) hm 0.07 
Allocation to population monitoring (propn of B - 
static) 
 0.5 
Length of manager’s monitoring horizon (years)  10 
Length of manager’s assessment horizon (years)  50 
Propn of years below threshold N tolerated by 
manager 
 0.1 
Number of years per run  50 
Number of runs per condition  20 
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Table S2. Results of changing conditions concerning manager’s awareness of harvester behaviour. Results are from 20 runs per condition, each 
of 50 years, with the summary statistics taken from years 30-50. The conditions are: “hm=0.07” – the harvesters do not maximise utility but 
simply follow the HCR, which is a simple proportional harvest rate of 0.07 (this rate is also used for all other simulations except Ymax). 
“Ymax” – the harvesters follow the HCR, which is optimised to maximise yield over the reporting period (which is at HCR=0.12). In both these 
cases, as there is no harvester OM, all harvest is legal and utility is not calculated. “OA” – the harvesters maximise utility and the managers have 
no power to control their harvest, because the penalty is zero. “1-S-NH” – the penalty is 1, the manager has a static allocation of monitoring 
resources of 0.5 to each activity, and the manager assumes the HCR will be followed exactly (i.e. that there is no harvester decision-making). “1-
I-NH” – the penalty is 1, the allocation of monitoring resources is informed, i.e. is model-based at the beginning of the simulation, but the 
manager assumes the HCR will be followed exactly. In this case, they allocate all their resources to population monitoring. “1-I-H” – penalty of 
1, informed allocation, and the manager takes harvester decisions into account. In this case they allocate all their resources to law enforcement. 
“5-S-NH”, “5-I-NH”, “5-I-H” – as before but with a penalty of 5. In 5-I-H, the manager allocates 10% of their resources to law enforcement. 
 
Metrics are: N = population size; CV N = Coefficient of Variation of population size. N Thresh = proportion of years in which the population 
goes below the conservation threshold. Actual H = average actual harvest by the harvester. Legal H = the amount of harvest prescribed in the 
HCR. In the first 2 conditions, the HCR is followed exactly so Actual H and Legal H are equivalent. U = average annual household utility. In the 
first two conditions there is no harvester so no utility. U Thresh = proportion of years in which the utility goes below the utility threshold. N prop 
K = the population size as a proportion of carrying capacity. Illegal propn = the illegal harvest as a proportion of total harvest; the negative value 
occurs because the actual harvest is slightly less than the legal quota. 
 
N CV N 
N 
Thresh 
Actual 
H CV H 
Legal 
H CV H U U CV 
U 
Thresh 
N prop 
K 
Illegal 
propn 
hm=0.07 318 25.3 0.04 22.8 33.5 0.64
Ymax 218 49.4 0.26 27.3 56.0 0.44
OA 196 55.7 0.35 23.8 53.8 14.4 69.4 3.22 18.66 0.11 0.39 0.396
1-S-NH 256 42.0 0.20 25.9 38.3 18.3 47.3 3.41 12.98 0.07 0.51 0.293
1-I-NH 221 48.9 0.24 26.6 47.5 16.1 50.4 3.35 15.80 0.09 0.44 0.397
1-I-H 265 32.5 0.11 26.2 31.3 18.8 50.0 3.60 5.44 0.01 0.53 0.280
5-S-NH 323 25.9 0.05 22.8 33.3 23.1 33.4 3.70 3.94 0.00 0.65 -0.012
5-I-NH 226 43.3 0.20 27.2 42.1 16.4 45.5 3.47 11.93 0.06 0.45 0.399
5-I-H 306 29.3 0.08 23.1 28.3 21.7 32.2 3.54 8.76 0.05 0.61 0.061
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Table S3. Relationships between the different performance metrics for the range of 
simulations described in Figure 3 and Table S2. All the relationships are linear in form except 
Utility – Illegal harvest proportion (Fig. S2), hence a simple correlation coefficient is given in 
each case. The metrics are the proportion of years in which the population is below the 
conservation threshold of 30% of K (“population below threshold”); the proportion of years 
in which the utility is below 50% of the maximum utility for that set of runs (“utility below 
threshold”); the actual harvest rate; mean household utility. The relationship of these metrics 
with additional indicator variables is also shown; the harvest rate given in the HCR, illegal 
harvesting as a proportion of the HCR harvest level, population size, coefficient of variation 
(CV) of population size, coefficient of variation of utility. 
 
Correlation coefficient 
Performance Metrics 
Population below threshold – Utility below threshold 0.909 
Utility – Utility below threshold -0.978 
Utility – Population below threshold -0.965 
Population below threshold – actual harvest rate 0.517 
Utility –actual harvest rate -0.247 
Utility below threshold – actual harvest rate 0.210 
Additional indicator variables 
Population below threshold – HCR harvest rate -0.939 
Utility – HCR harvest rate 0.879 
Utility –Illegal harvest proportion -0.774 
Utility – Population size 0.881 
Population size – Population below threshold -0.960 
Population below threshold – Population CV 0.993 
Utility below threshold -Utility CV 0.991 
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Table S4. The results of changing both the parameters of the returns to labour functions, βF 
and  βH (Eqn S3) and the household model structure (Equns S2a-6a vs S2b-6b). The 
exploration was carried out under deterministic conditions for 50 years with the values in the 
last 5 years (after transients) reported. The penalty for overharvesting was set to zero; this 
meant that management decisions were irrelevant and the results represent purely the 
household optimisation. The price of harvested products was set to 1 to counterbalance the 
lack of law enforcement costs; all other parameters were as in Table S1. N = resource 
population size; LH = proportion of household labour allocated to harvesting (the remainder is 
allocated to agriculture).  
 
a) Agricultural products consumed, harvested products sold. 
 
βF =0.4 βF =0.8 βF=1.2 
 βH N LH N LH N LH 
0.1 105 0.2 122 0.12 132 0.08 
0.5 144 0.56 198 0.38 228 0.3 
1 155 0.72 222 0.56 267 0.46 
1.5 168 0.78 233 0.66 286 0.56 
2 161 0.84 242 0.72 303 0.62 
 
b) Both products sold. Two numbers separated by a slash denotes fluctuations between these 
values, two numbers separated by a hyphen denotes the extremes of the range of values 
observed. 
 
βF =0.4 βF =0.8 βF=1.2 
 βH N LH N LH N LH 
0.1 125 0.1 144 0.06 152 0.04 
0.5 183 0.42 231/2 0.28/0.3 263 0.22 
1 187 0.64 233/4 0.52/0.54 263-317 0.02-1 
1.5 342-412 0.02/0.94 498 0.02 488 0.02 
2 499 0.02 499 0.02 499 0.02 
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Table S5. Performance metrics for the full stochastic models under two levels of each of βF 
and  βH and two assumptions about market access (Consumed = agricultural products 
consumed; Sold = both products sold). The model was run using the baseline values in Table 
S1 for all other parameters. Nthresh = The mean proportion of years in which the population 
size goes below the conservation threshold (30% of K). Utility = The mean utility of resource 
users. The “sold” utility is lower than the “Consumed” utility due to the assumptions 
concerning the elasticities of consumption (in the absence of the agricultural good, the 
elasticity of consumption of the composite good remains at 0.5). IllegalH = Percentage of the 
harvest specified in the HCR represented by the additional illegal harvesting. 
 
Nthresh  Utility  IllegalH 
Consumed βF  βF  βF
 βH 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.2
0.4 0.37 0.21 3.50 3.56 103.4 45.9
1.2 0.28 0.07 3.44 3.45 86.4 3.4
    
Sold βF  βF  βF
 βH 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.2
0.4 0.38 0.25 2.20 2.17 118.4 70.2
1.2 0.39 0.09 2.12 2.09 111.8 66.3
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Figure S1. The effect of a range of model conditions on three performance metrics: a) the 
proportion of years in which the population size is below the conservation threshold (“ConsT 
proportion”); b) the harvest. Both the actual harvest (“actualH”) and the allowed harvest 
under the HCR (“legalH”) are shown; any difference represents illegal harvesting; c) the 
proportion of years in which the household utility is below the utility threshold (“UtilT 
proportion”). The model is run under default parameter values (Table S1). The conditions 
are: “hm=0.07” – the harvesters do not maximise utility but simply follow the HCR, which is 
a proportional harvest rate of 0.07 (this rate is also used for all other simulations except 
Ymax). “Ymax” – the harvesters follow the HCR, which is optimised to maximise yield over 
the reporting period  (which is at HCR=0.12). In both these cases, as there is no harvester 
OM, all harvest is legal and utility is not calculated. “OA” – the harvesters maximise utility 
and the managers have no power to control their harvest, because the penalty is zero. “1-S-
NH” – the penalty is 1, the manager has a static allocation of monitoring resources of 0.5 to 
each activity, and the manager assumes the HCR will be followed exactly (i.e. that there is no 
harvester decision-making). “1-I-NH” – the penalty is 1, the allocation of monitoring 
resources is informed, i.e. is model-based at the beginning of the simulation, but the manager 
assumes the HCR will be followed exactly. In this case, they allocate all their resources to 
population monitoring. “1-I-H” – penalty of 1, informed allocation, and the manager takes 
harvester decisions into account. In this case they allocate all their resources to law 
enforcement. “5-S-NH”, “5-I-NH”, “5-I-H” – as before but with a penalty of 5. In 5-I-H, the 
manager allocates 10% of their resources to law enforcement. 
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Figure S2. The relationship between the mean utility of the harvesting household over the 
observation period (“U”) and the illegal harvest as a proportion of the legal harvest specified 
in the HCR (“Propn illegal”). A negative value means the household harvests less than the 
specified quota. 
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Figure S3. The effect of changes in the parameter Beta for the returns to labour from 
harvesting (BetaH) and agriculture (BetaF) on a) the allocation of labour to harvesting, and b) 
the resultant resource population size. Functional forms for the returns to labour are given 
earlier in the Supplementary material. At values of the parameter Beta > 1, labour allocated to 
a particular activity produces low output at low-medium allocation levels, increasing non-
linearly at high levels of allocation. Values of Beta <1 produce rapid increases in output as 
allocation increases from low levels. If Beta=1, labour and output are linearly related.  
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Figure S4. The allocation of resources to monitoring (“Alloc”) and the allocation of labour to 
harvesting by the household (“Lh”), when the manager is aiming either to maximise the 
harvest yield (“maxH”) or maximise the long-term utility of the household (“maxU”). 
Managers seeking to maximise harvest carry out very little law enforcement, particularly 
when penalties are low. Those seeking to maximise long-term utility do carry out law 
enforcement, in order to keep resource stocks at a higher level. The system is highly 
stochastic, including observation error for both the manager and the harvester as well as 
variable population size, and the manager’s assessment is based upon a single run of the 
model. The allocation-yield/utility curves are also relatively flat near the optimum. Together 
these factors combine to produce variability in the allocation curves. 
 
 
 
